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I. Abstract 
In 1999, a company in Israel did what no one thought could be done – it 
struck natural gas and lots of it. Since then, two of the largest offshore natural gas 
fields have been found in Israel’s waters, disproving the belief that Moses led the 
Jews to the only Middle Eastern country to not have petroleum. In 2011, it found 
what is believed to hold 250 billion barrels of shale oil – an amount that rivals the 
260 billion barrels of crude oil in Saudi Arabia. Most economists argue, however, 
that this is not good news for Israel due to the “resource curse.” The concept 
claims that finding an abundant amount of natural resources actually harms the 
local economy, politics and society as a whole through means of abuse of power, 
manipulation and pure disregard for societal welfare. This usually is applied to 
small, poor and previously corrupt governments. 
 Currently, Israel is in a good position to avoid the resource curse. It is a 
militarily and economically strong, democratic nation. It has many resources 
available to it as well as lessons from the past to help it avoid the turmoil that 
historically faces nations with newfound petroleum wealth. This paper argues that 
not only can Israel beat the resource curse, but that the concept of the resource 
curse itself is flawed. Through historical examples of Nigeria and Canada, it is 
proven that not only small and weak governments fall victim to the greed and 
temptation that follows new resource wealth. The United States and Norway will 
show that with correct policy response, governments can avoid the curse 
highlighting the fact that an avoidable “curse” is, in fact, no “curse” at all.  
 Finally, this paper will outline the appropriate political response for Israel 
containing several policies that limit sector transfers and exports as well as 
outlines the establishment of two sovereign wealth funds. Israel, like others 
before, can avoid the resource curse and boost all parts of its economy by taking 
several intricate steps.  
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II. Advice to Future Honors Students  
The biggest piece of advice I can give to juniors reading this either because 
you’re overzealous, overachieving or in Eric’s capstone prep class is to just enjoy 
senior year. I know this section is supposed to be about how to do well on the 
capstone, how to manage your time and how to exceed honors’ expectations. But 
that’s not what I am going to tell you – you know all of that already or you 
wouldn’t be in honors. No, what I am going to tell you is that it is possible to have 
fun, maybe too much fun if you ask my mother, and still complete a good 
capstone. My junior spring, my advisor surprised me with the news that he was 
going on sabbatical my senior fall. I was freaking out! How was I supposed to do 
my capstone without my advisor?! Then he had the audacity to tell me that I 
wouldn’t actually start working on it until next spring, anyway. I was appalled. 
How could he think I would wait that long to start? Well, he was right. I’m not 
going to give the exact date I actually started my capstone...but let’s just say that 
it was not last spring. The point is, don’t let it take over your senior year. Honors 
students are the best at procrastinating and still presenting exceptional work, so 
show yourself, your advisor and honors what you’re made of and wait last minute 
on a few deadlines; turn in your civic engagement hours the last week of senior 
year (wait who does that?...); and just take satisfaction in the fact that you turned 
in a project in 1/xxx of the time it would take most people. If you ask me, that’s a 
skill all in its own. I do suggest making the first deadline in April though, the last 
few weeks of your senior year will be much more fun and stress free that way. If 
you take only one thing from this, or are lightly skimming this looking for bold 
words, let it be this: 
 
Be smart. Have fun. Go to Chuck’s. 
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III. Introduction 
 
“Let me tell you something that we Israelis have against 
Moses; he took us 40 years through the desert in order to bring us 
to the one spot in the Middle East that has no oil.” Israeli Prime 
Minister Golda Meir spoke these words at a banquet in Tel Aviv in 19731. For the 
first half century Israel was a state, it was energy poor and energy dependent. It 
was not until the turn of the 20th century that Israel joined its neighbors in a 
resource richness of its own made up of oil and natural gas. This discovery, 
however, was not met with open arms by all scholars, scientists, politicians or 
citizens of Israel. Many fear that it could be a victim of the resource curse: a 
phenomenon that suggests finding an abundance of any natural resource is cause 
for distress rather than excitement.  It claims that “natural resource abundant 
countries tend to grow at a slower pace” and, in many occasions, turn out to be 
“development failures.”2 However, this “curse” holds true only if it is both 
inevitable and self-perpetuating. This paper argues that not only is the situation 
described by the resource curse avoidable with the correct reaction to the 
newfound natural resources, but it is also directly caused by actions by 
                                                 
1 Buck, Tobias. “Field of dreams: Israel’s natural gas.” Financial Times 
Magazine 31 August 2012.  
2 Papyrakis, Elissaios. “The resource curse hypothesis and its transmission 
channels.” Journal of Comparative Economics 10 November 2003.  
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governments and companies that deal with the resources. Israel’s newfound 
petroleum resources have opened up the country to a potentially powerful change 
economically, politically and socially. With appropriate policy implementation 
Israel can both avoid the resource curse and grow to be one of the world’s largest 
energy exporters. 
IV. Dependency History 
 
Israel’s first drill attempt to find oil was in 1947, before the territory was 
officially declared a state. Though it did find minimal amounts in its first 
discovery of 1955 in the Heletz Field, very trivial and non-productive amounts 
were discovered for the next forty-five years.3 As a member of the Middle East, 
Israel was expected to have black gold under its surface. Its neighbors Libya, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran all had some of the largest reserves in the world at this 
time.4 Israel, however, suffered from an extreme resource lack and, therefore, 
dependency on foreign petroleum products.  
 Israel was, and still is today, plagued by a western standard of living 
partnered with a developed country’s economic and population growth. It cannot 
sustain its current living expectations at its current growth rate. It spends as much 
as two-percent of its GDP on energy imports, including natural gas, oil and coal, 
                                                 
3 “Petroleum and Natural Gas Prospecting.” Israel’s Ministry of Energy and 
Water Resources 3 March 2013. Web.  
4 “The World’s Biggest Oil Reserves.” CNBC 2012. Web.  
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which is more than most developed countries in the world today.5 In 1980, ninety-
nine percent of its energy derived from crude oil alone was met by foreign 
imports totaling to over 165,000 barrels per day and about $2.2 billion 
expenditure.6  This number was almost equal to all of Israel’s industrial exports, 
making payment for the energy demand very difficult as its trade balance could 
rarely reach a surplus. It was not, however, the hardest part of Israel’s energy 
dependence. Only two countries, aside from the United States, were willing to sell 
to Israel publically as recent as 1980. Egypt and Mexico together only made up 
fifty-five percent of Israel’s imports, leaving the oil-starved nation to look for 
exporters willing to trade with Israel out of the public eye.7 
Luckily, Israel was not alone in its time of need. In September of 1975, it 
signed the Second Sinai Agreement with the United States and Egypt. This 
agreement promised Israel to evacuate the Sinai oilfields that it accumulated in 
the 1967 war and to return them to Egypt. This agreement was done in the interest 
of easing tensions with its neighbor, Egypt and western ally, the United States. 
This political ploy, however, came at a price. Israel was able to extract annually 
4.5 million tons of crude oil from the Sinai oilfields at the time of this deal, saving 
it about $350 million a year on import expenses. In efforts to lessen the economic 
blow caused by returning the field, the United States and Israel signed the 1975 
U.S. – Israel Memorandum of Agreement. This agreement did several things to 
                                                 
5 Mason, M., and Mor, A. Renewable Energy in the Middle East: Enhancing 
Security through Regional Cooperation. NATO Science for Peace and Security 
Series C: Environmental Security, 2009. Web.  
6 Bahbah, Bishara A. ““The United States and Israel's Energy Security.” Journal 
of Palestine Studies Vol 11, No 2. Winter 1982. 113 – 131.  
 
7 Ibid. 
 8 
reassure Israel of its decision to release Sinai. First, the United States promised to 
compensate the loss of the Sinai oilfields for five years starting in 1976. The 
second method of insurance for Israel lay in another five-year period to be started 
whenever Israel first showed a demand for more energy that it could not find 
independently through either internal or external means. There were to be annual 
meetings between United States experts and Israeli representatives to determine 
Israel’s true demand for energy. If the United States then believed that Israel put 
its best efforts into meetings that need, and still could not fulfill it, the United 
States would make available for purchase the determined about of oil, gas or coal. 
This took place assuming the United States was under no energy-related hardships 
of its own, including embargos and its own energy insecurity.  The United States 
also agreed to provide funding for oil storage facilities with the estimated cost of 
$350 million.  
Though this was a safe and effective method of insurance for Israel, it still 
meant that it would have to find 4.5 million tons of crude oil in the foreign market 
to make up for its new and larger lack. This deal, in fact, made Israel more 
dependent on foreign energy. Israel turned to Iran to make up for its higher 
foreign demand shortly after the deal was made. However, when Iran’s supply fell 
short in reaction to its revolution, Israel was forced to look into new international 
market and new potential trade partners including Venezuela, Gabon and Nigeria. 
In 1978, Israel was about to convince Mexico increase its crude exports. This 
however, was still not enough, so Israel began looking harder for more internal 
options. An oil field it still had near the Sinai Peninsula, Alma, was currently 
producing 26,000 barrels per day. Believing the infrequent reserve reports that 
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claimed this was not enough, the government aggressively thought it could do 
more; soon it was producing over 160,000 billion barrels per day. This came at a 
cost however, as it quickly depleted the nation’s reserves.  
In 1979, a deal between the United States and Israel extended the 1975 
Agreement for another ten years. This was deemed an appropriate safeguard and 
incentive for Israel to remain energy secure. This was also perfect timing for the 
Camp David talks and the Peace Treaty of March 1979 between Egypt and Israel. 
It was “widely believed that had Israel not acquired energy security, no peace 
treaty would have been made possible.”8 Though Israel was temporarily aided by 
the market oil-glut in 1981, it eventually fell back into same dependency on and 
barely sustainable search for foreign oil. Several more Agreements between Israel 
and the United States followed in 1979 and in the early 1980’s to curb Israel’s 
still-dire dependency.  This was effective at first, causing Israel to diversify its 
imports and create better relations with other nations, but it eventually led to a 
very heavy United States dependency – an unexpected outcome.9  
Between 1950 and 2000, almost five hundred wells were drilled in Israel. 
Fewer than ten of these wells produced noticeable amounts of oil or natural gas, 
only one of which was significant (note the Sinai field above). In 1962, Lewis 
Weeks, then the former chief Geologist of Exxon, prepared a report for the Israeli 
government that estimated five hundred million to two billion barrels of oil would 
                                                 
8 Bahbah, Bishara A. “The United States and Israel's Energy Security.” Journal 
of Palestine Studies Vol 11, No 2. Winter 1982. 124. 
9 This section and its analysis relied heavily upon the facts provided in: 
 Bahbah, Bishara A. “The United States and Israel's Energy Security.” Journal 
of Palestine Studies Vol 11, No 2. Winter 1982. 113 – 131.  
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ultimately be recovered in Israel.10 In 1979, James Wilson, then the former chief 
geologist of Shell Oil Company, prepared a report for the Israeli government that 
estimated that the onshore natural gas reserves potential of the country was 330 
million to 2 billion barrels.11 Though these reports were initially welcomed news, 
after years of no results they were not expected to come true. In 1999, this attitude 
changed with the discovery of the offshore Noa field. In 2000, the future of Israel 
changed with the discovery of the Mari B field. Together, the two fields contained 
an estimated forty-five bcm of natural gas.12 
V. Oil and Natural Gas Discoveries  
 
Noble Energy, based out of Houston, TX, USA, was the main company 
responsible for both historical finds. It is one of the United States’ leading 
independent oil and gas companies and operates both domestically and 
internationally in the Gulf of Mexico, Argentina, China, Ecuador, Equatorial 
Guinea, the Mediterranean Sea, the North Sea and Vietnam. Since its first 
discoveries in Israeli territory, Noble Energy has been instrumental in discovering 
several more offshore reserves around the world.13  As seen below, the most 
prominent and bountiful of the finds have been the Tamar and Leviathan fields 
with 246 bcm and 480 bcm of natural gas, respectively. The Tamar field alone, at 
the time of its discovery the largest deep-water natural gas discovery in the world, 
                                                 
10 “Petroleum and Natural Gas Prospecting.” Israel’s Ministry of Energy and 
Water Resources 3 March 2013. Web. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 “Eastern Mediterranean.” Noble Energy 5 March 2013. Web.  
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has enough natural gas to meet Israel’s current demand for more than two 
decades.14 By simply moving further away from the Israeli Coast, Noble Energy 
along with several Israel state-owned and other international companies, including 
Delek Group, have been able to uncover more than 800,000 proven bcm of Israeli 
natural gas and another estimated 680 bcm.15 Though this does not solve Israel’s 
oil dependency, the opportunities offered by abundant reserves of natural gas 
provide Israel with a much brighter energy and economic future.  
                                                 
14 Wurmser, David. “The Geopolitics of Israel’s Offshore Gas Reserves.” 
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 4 April 2013.  
15 Barkat, Amiram. “Israel’s gas reserves near export threshold.” Globes: 
Israel’s Business Arena 10 March 2013.  
 12 
Table 1: Israel's Largest Natural Gas Reserves in 2012, Offshore  
Reserve Size Estimate1 Partners2 
Leviathan 480 bcm 2c 
Delek Group (45%) 
Noble Energy (40%) 
Ratio Oil (15%) 
Tamar 246 bcm 2p 
Noble Energy (36%) 
Delek Group (32%) 
Isramco (29%) 
Dor Gas (4%) 
Tanin 31 bcm 
17 bcm (2c) 
14 bcm (best 
estimate) 
Delek Group (53%) 
Noble Energy (47%) 
Mari B 30 bcm 1p Delek Group (53%) Noble Energy (47%)  
Shimshon 15.6 bcm 2c Isramco (60%) ATP Oil & Gas (40%) 
Dalit 14 bcm 2c 
Noble Energy (36%) 
Delek Group (32%) 
Isramco (29%) 
Dor Gas (4%) 
Dolphin 2.3 bcm 2c` 
Delek Group (45%) 
Noble Energy (40%) 
Ratio Oil (15%) 
Noa 1.3 bcm 1p Delek Group (53%) Noble Energy (47%) 
Pinnacles 1.3 bcm 1p Delek Group (53%) Noble Energy (47%) 
 
1 The SPRE-PRMS uses three uncertainty categories, or scenarios, to identify estimates of recoverable 
resources: reserve scenarios are categorized as proved (1P), proved + probable (2P) and proved + probable + 
possible (3P); contingent resources are categorized as 1C, 2C and 3C; and prospective reserves are 
categorized as low estimate, best estimate and high estimate. 
2 Percentages have been rounded. Totals may not add up to 100%. 
Source: APCO Forum. “Israel’s Natural Gas Sector.” APCO Worldwide 2012. Web. 
 
Though current discoveries are more than enough to have a great impact within 
Israeli politics, economics and social society, there are experts that believe this is 
only the beginning. A U.S. Geopolitical Survey predicts that the sea area between 
Egypt and Turkey, known as the Levantine Basin, could contain up to 3400 bcm 
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of natural gas, forty-percent of which lies within Israel’s maritime borders.16 That 
means 425% more natural gas findings than Israel has already discovered 
offshore.  
 Israel has also struck shale oil, or “black gold”, in recent years, though not 
to the extent of its natural gas reserves. In April of 2011, energy company Israel 
Energy Initiative estimated its discovery in the onshore Shelfa Shale to hold 
nearly 250 billion barrels of shale oil. Put into perspective, this rivals the total 
crude oil supply in Saudi Arabia of 260 billion barrels. Currently, Israel uses a 
great majority of its oil as fuel for transportation.17 However, it still uses a small 
part of it for electricity conversion as see below. 
 
   Figure 1: 2011 Electricity Generation by Source 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “Israel Statistics.” IEA 2013. Web. 
 
Professor Carol Parish, of the chemistry department at the University of 
Richmond in Virginia, has labeled the oil found in the Shelfa Shale and “game 
                                                 
16 Buck, Tobias. “Field of dreams: Israel’s natural gas.” Financial Times 
Magazine 31 August 2012.  
17 “Israel Statistics.” IEA 2013. Web. 
Oil
Nat ural Gas
Coal
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changer.”18 Parish completed a Fulbright Fellowship with Professor Sason Shaik, 
the director of the Lise Meitner Minerva Center for Computational Quantum 
Chemistry at Hebrew University. 19  Though the exact science and the 
environmental impacts behind extracting shale oil is still heavily debated, the 
reserves themselves fall under the “proven” category of reserves and available for 
economically viable extraction.2021 The most recent offshore oil discoveries are the 
Gabriella and Yitzhak reserves found in shallow waters off the coast of Tel Aviv 
in March of this year.22 Additionally, the latest Noble Energy forecast estimates a 
twenty-five percent chance of discovering two offshore oil fields within the 
Leviathan Basin, both of which are predicted to have about 300 million barrels of 
oil.23 If this comes to pass, Israel can be one of the world’s biggest energy players 
within the next 50 years. With such large reserves and estimated discoveries, here 
began the concern about the resource curse. How long before the government falls 
for the “wrong incentives” set by these sources?24 Upon discovery, some groups 
claimed “Israel and Israelis must be wary of the significant potential that the 
                                                 
18 Udasin, Sharon. “250 b. barrels of shae discovery a ‘game changer.’” The 
Jerusalem Post 17 December 2012. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 “Proven” resources defined by British Petroleum Statistics are "the estimated 
quantities of [a resource] which geological and engineering data demonstrate with 
reasonable certainty to be recoverable in future years from known reservoirs 
under current economic and operating conditions." 
22 Globes. “Oil gas discovered off Tel Aviv coastline.” The Jerusalem Post 13 
March 2012.  
23 Barkat, Amiram. “Dreaming of Leviathan oil.” Globes: Israel’s Business 
Arena 2 April 2013. 
24 Pear, Jason. “Israel’s Resource Curse.” The Bennett Commentary 23 
August 2011.  
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Leviathan gas fields will harm the state and, more importantly, its citizens.”25 The 
concept has followed Israel’s government in each decision it has made so far and 
will continue to do so until it has set appropriate polices and has successfully 
beaten the curse.  
VI. The Petroleum Law  
 
 In response to the current and expected high amounts of commercial 
traffic and demand, Israel must control the actions and behaviors of the 
companies and countries within its borders and maritime property lines. 
Established in 1952, The Petroleum Law in Israel has three levels of petroleum 
rights, laid out in Articles Two, Three and Four, as follows26: 
1. Preliminary Permit: This is the lowest level right, which may be granted for a 
period not exceeding 18 months.  The permit allows the prospector to conduct 
preliminary investigations, except for test drilling, to determine the possibility of 
discovering petroleum in the permit. The recipient of a preliminary permit is 
entitled to request a “priority right” on the permit area, which, if granted, prevents 
the government from awarding any other petroleum right(s) on the area.  There 
are no restrictions as to maximum size of the permit area or to the number of 
permits which may be held by one prospector, however the prospector must have 
a reasonable plan of operation and must show possession of the necessary 
financial resources to execute the plan for the size of the permit area requested.  
2. License: This second type of petroleum right bestows an exclusive right for 
further exploration work. It requires the drilling of test wells to determine if the 
license area does in fact hold reserves. The initial term of a license is up to three 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 The following descriptions of the Petroleum Law are summaries of the 
actual Law: The Petroleum Law. Israel. 5712 - 1952. Revised 1965. Web.  
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years and may be extended up to an additional four years.  A license area may not 
exceed 100,000 acres. If petroleum is discovered, the prospector has the statutory 
right for the third type of petroleum right. 
3. Lease: The initial lease term is 30 years, extendible to a maximum period of 50 
years. A lease provides the prospector the exclusive right of exploration, 
extraction in the lease area and requires that the prospector produce petroleum in 
commercial quantities.  The prospector is entitled to transport and market the 
petroleum produced in the lease area, subject to the right of the Government to 
call upon him to supply local needs first at the market price.  The prospector is 
liable for a royalty of one-eighth, 12.5 %, of the quantity of petroleum produced 
and stored, excluding that used in operating the lease area. It is also subject to a 
minimum royalty.  
 
All petroleum resources within Israeli borders belong to the government. To apply 
for a preliminary permit for both on-and offshore, a company must submit an 
application to the Petroleum Commissioner. If the commissioner denies the 
permit, the applicant may appeal to the Knesset for approval. The Ministry of 
Energy and Water Resources, previously the Ministry of Infrastructure, oversees 
the process and the companies once they receive petroleum rights. The map on the 
following page shows the division of permits, licenses and leases for Israeli 
reserves as of April 2012.  
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VII. Current Energy Demand 
 
 Although the discoveries began taking place over ten years ago, as shown 
in the map there are still very few leases that have been awarded. Most of the 
reserves are not yet being accessed. Today, Israel is still a major importer of 
energy and its energy demands are expected to grow in every sector. 
Table 2: Israel's 2011 Net Energy Consumption 
 Production Consumption Net Import/Export 
Oil 
(thousand b/d) 
5.84 263.01 -257.17 
Natural Gas 
(bil, cubic ft.) 
92 117 -25 
Coal 
(mil. short tons) 
0 13.909 -13.909 
Source: “Israel.” Energy Information Agency, USA 2013. 
 
Figure 2: Israel's Natural Gas Demand Forecast 
 
Source: "Forecasted Demand." Israel Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 2013. Web. 
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   Figure 3: 2009 Natural Gas Use by Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Source: “Israel.” Energy Delta Institute 2009. 
 
Israel’s major trade partners for energy are the United States, Egypt (until 2012), 
Iraq and the Caspian Region including Russia and Azerbaijan. Israel receives 
ninety-percent of its oil imports from the Caspian Region via the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan, BTC, pipeline area.27 This is a dangerous political and economic move to 
place such a dependency on one area for oil. This lesson was well learned last 
year in April when Egypt cancelled the 2005 Natural Gas Deal it had with Israel, 
proving almost fifty-percent of Israel natural gas imports at below market prices.28  
 There were several reasons for Egypt’s decision. What started as a 
payment dispute turned into a full on political and economic conflict. In 2011, 
Israeli diplomats were run out of the Cairo Embassy.29 The people did not agree 
with the amiable relations the new government was having with Israel and wanted 
to show “the gap between the views and policies of the region's leaders and the 
                                                 
27 Mizroch, Amir and Nadel, Ryan. “Israel pushes to reduce oil 
dependency.” The Jerusalem Post 3 November 2006.  
28 “Egypt scraps Israel gas supply deal.” BBB News 23 April 2012.  
29 Kurtzer, Daniel. “Is the Egypt-Israeli Relationship Over?” Foreign Affairs 
18 September 2011.  
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attitudes of the Arab street” according to Foreign Affairs.30 They were upset with 
the constant ground violence at the Sinai border as well as resented the 2005 
Natural Gas Deal as it was a reminder of President Mubarak’s previous corrupt 
administration. The government in Egypt, however, could not reverse the decision 
of the companies to break the deal. It saw an opportunity to appease the people as 
well as seize back their source of natural gas that they currently need as 
production in Egypt has been dwindling. Aside from forcing Israel to nearly 
deplete its stored natural gas in 2012, this cancellation of a trade deal has political 
implications and roadblocks. It ended one of Israel’s only positive relations with 
an Arab country and subsequently one of its few opportunities to ease relations 
with the rest of its Middle Eastern neighbors. This is discussed more later.  
VIII. Political Implications and Future Roadblocks 
Israel’s Government: The Small Party Dilemma 
 
Israel is a parliamentary democracy: a system of government in which the 
executive branch derives its power from the legislative branch, or the Knesset in 
Israel. There is a Head of State, President Shimon Peres, and a Head of 
Government, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. After elections in January of 
this year, there are twelve parties with seats in the 120-member Knesset, ranging 
from two to thirty-one seats per party.31  
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Central Intelligence Agency. “The CIA Factbook: Israel.” 16 April 2013. 
Web. 
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Table 3: Israel's 13th Knesset by Party 
Likud Yisrael 
Beitenu 31 
Yesh Atid 19 
Israel Labor 
Party 15 
HaBayit 
HaYehudi 12 
Shas 11 
United Torah 
Judaism 7 
Hatenua 
Chaired…  
 
6 
Meretz 6 
Hadash 4 
Ra’am-Ta’al 4 
Nat. Democratic 
Assembly 3 
Kadima 2 
Source: The Central Elections Committee, Israel  
 
With such a small population, 7.7 million in 2013, Israel has a high number of 
small yet active political parties creating an interesting balance, or lack 
thereof, in its government. The set up of parties in the Israeli system is mostly 
based off of party coalitions as no single party has won the majority since 
Israel’s statehood in 1948.32 Because of this, even the smallest parties have the 
opportunity to make a difference and have a strong voice. This seems ideal for 
any type of democracy, but not necessarily for efficiency. This could provide 
Israel with difficulty moving forward with policy structure concerning its new 
resources.  
Likud Yisrael Beitenu is the majority coalition with 31 seats. It is 
fairly liberal with its economic views for identifying with right-sided and 
Zionist ideologies. It supports free-markets, free-trade agreements and has 
pushed for several privatizations of government-owned companies.33 Prime 
                                                 
32 “Guide to Israel’s political parties.” BBC News: Middle East 21 January 
2013. 
33 Ibid. 
 22 
Minister Netanyahu, the leader of the coalition, is very much for oil and 
natural gas exploration and extraction. The Prime Minister celebrated the 
Jewish Sabbath on March 30 this year in a press conference following the first 
flow of the Tamar field’s gas to Israel. “We are taking an important step 
toward energy independence,” he said. “We have advanced the natural gas 
sector in Israel over the last decade, which will be good for the Israeli 
economy and for all Israelis.”34   
 Though there were concerns from other parties that this historic 
moment happened on one of the holiest days of the year, there seems to be no 
large opposition within the Knesset to drilling offshore gas. In fact, the more 
strict Zionist parties believe that this was meant to happen to them due to 
biblical signs. “Blessed of the LORD be [Joseph’s] land, with the choice 
things of heaven, with the dew, and from the deep lying beneath… “ [ch. 
33:13] and “they will draw out the abundance of the seas [natural gas], and 
the hidden treasures of the sand [oil]. [ch. 33:19].35 The small party set up 
presents a dilemma for the future of Israeli energy – although right now there 
is no major political opposition to the natural gas extraction, any coalition 
could potentially determine policy outcomes and potentially manipulate the 
system. The other issue this political situation raises for Israel’s future 
concerning the newfound petroleum wealth involves the resource curse. 
Because the government is susceptible to change via small party coalitions, 
the opportunity for governmental corruption and private lobbyist manipulation 
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is very apparent and accessible. The state must be aware of its internal actors’ 
behavior when the time comes to make decisions concerning profit for 
individuals and welfare for the people. This is something to be monitored.  
Environmentalist Groups 
 
There are, however, several groups within Israel that oppose extraction 
of these new petroleum discoveries. One United States based group, “Jews 
Against Fracking”, claims that “the expansion of hydrofracking is not aligned 
with our Jewish values.”36 The largest environmentalist opposition in Israel is 
led by the “Green Zionist Alliance.” GZA representative David Krantz has 
written many articles cautioning Israelis’ excitement about the oil and natural 
gas discoveries warning them that “the oil isn’t crude; it’s shale oil.”37 His 
concern is that the extraction method, hydraulic fracturing, is more dangerous 
than simply extracting crude oil like that found in Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates. The benefit of outspoken environmental groups in relation to 
the resource curse is their ability to see past profit and toward a bigger picture. 
Groups like the GZA can push the government toward more environmentally 
benign policies in the interests of the broader public welfare. This can avoid 
issues like in Nigeria or Saudi Arabia where environmental degradation 
afflicts large sections of the country.  
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Hydraulic Fracturing 
 
 Hydraulic Fracturing, more commonly known as hydrofracking or 
fracking, is the method used to horizontally extract petroleum that is locked in 
a shale rock below ground. FracFocus is an American organization that 
collects hydrofracturing data, deposits, wells, chemicals, etc., and provides the 
information to the public via its website.38 It describes the hydrofracking 
process as a “technique [that] uses a specially blended liquid which is pumped 
into a well under extreme pressure causing cracks in rock formations 
underground. These cracks in the rock then allow oil and natural gas to flow, 
increasing resource production.” 39  The petroleum reservoirs are typically 
6,000 – 10,000 feet below the surface while cement, steel and other casings 
are inserted into the wells every 1,000 - 4,000 feet to help prevent leaks of the 
water mixture or the extracted substance. The water mixture is around 99% 
water and sand, with the remaining consisting of chemical additives used for 
tasks such as cleaning, corrosion inhibiting and friction reduction. The website 
notes that fracking increases resource availability by providing a method that 
can reach more reserves, extraction efficiency by minimizing manual labor 
and costs and therefore increase overall profit. Part of this hails from its ability 
to extend the life of existing wells by providing access to damaged or tight 
shale formations.40  
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Water Conflict 
 
 As expected of most new technologies, the benefits of hydrofracking 
do have potential costs and risks. The process uses gargantuan amounts of 
fresh water, which must be readily available to extraction companies. In a 
country like Israel, historically at high risk of water scarcity, extra water is not 
easy to come by. This can be problematic for a country newly at risk for the 
resource curse. If Israel were to reallocate its water sources solely to energy 
extraction, the people and other sectors would suffer. It must find other 
sources to compensate. Water conflicts, though rarely resorting to military 
interaction, are common in the Middle East and have been for many years.41 
With ten percent of the worlds land, five percent of its population and only 
one percent of its fresh water, this can be expected.42 Three major bodies of 
water and causes of Middle Eastern dispute have been the Euphrates, Tigris 
and Nile Rivers. Though these do not directly affect Israel, they cause tensions 
to rise amongst countries from which Israel could potentially import water as 
well as heighten the importance of areas that do concern Israel, such as Golan 
Heights and the Jordan River. Golan Heights is an Israeli occupied area, 
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annexed in 1982 from Syria.43 It is very rich with its water resources and 
supplies several rivers and Lake Tiberias. This is partially why Israel has 
consistently refused to return the land to Syria, even under international 
pressures. The Jordanian River is and has been the other major water conflict 
for Israel. An American diplomat, sent as an envoy of President Eisenhower in 
1953, established a plan to share the water resources of the Jordan River 
between Palestine, Jordan, Israel, Syria and Lebanon.44 The Johnston Plan was 
as follows: 
 
Table 4: Shares of Riparian Countries in the Jordan River's Water 
According to the Johnston Plan 
Country Planned Water Shares (mm3 / yr) 
Palestine 257 
Jordan 463 
Israel 400 
Syria 132 
Lebanon 35 
Total 1287 
Source: Abu Ju’ub, Ghassan. “Water Conflicts in the Middle East between the Present and the 
Future.” 
 
 
These numbers were respected for a few years – until Israel needed irrigation 
for expansions in the Negev Dessert, hoping to attract more Jewish 
immigrants. The National Water Carrier was created in 1964 to channel fresh 
water from the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan River to the new establishments 
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in the southern Israel dessert.45 Seen as an act of aggression against Arab land, 
Lebanon, Syria and others created the Jordanian Diversion Authority to 
develop dams that would prevent Israel from accessing the necessary water 
sources. This led to several border conflicts and eventually, after more 
unrelated political clashes, the Six Day War of 1967. Former Minister of 
Defense and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had no doubts about the 
significance that water played in the war. “People generally regard 5 June 
1967 as the day the Six-Day War began. That is the official date. But, in 
reality, it started two-and-a-half years earlier, on the day Israel decided to act 
against the diversion of the Jordan.”46 
 
Table 5: Current Usage of Jordan River's Water 
Country Actual Usage of Water (mm3 / yr) 
Palestine 0 
Israel 700 
Jordan, Syria and Lebanon 410 
Total 1110 
Source: Abu Ju’ub, Ghassan. “Water Conflicts in the Middle East between the Present and the 
Future.” 
 
Israel took both Golan Heights and the West Bank under occupation in that 
war. As seen in the table above, Israel today uses more than its allocated 
shares by the Johnston plan, whilst Palestine uses none. It was after 1967 that 
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Palestine lost access to its main water source, the Jordan River.47 As of 2009, 
Palestine received only 25% of the amount that Israel does from the scarce 
West Bank water supply.48 If Palestine were to lose another water source in 
order to fuel Israel’s energy sector, this could be seen as an overspill effect of 
the curse into a neighbor.  
Even today, there are water struggles as the overall supply becomes 
scarcer throughout the Middle East and the world. A United Nations report 
projects that thirty nations will be water scarce in 2025, up from 20 in 1990. 
Eighteen of them are in the Middle East and North Africa. This list includes 
Israel.49 There is a fear that violence, and eventually more war, will break out 
if countries cannot work together to overcome this specific resource lack. The 
GZA is correct to be concerned about the origin of the newly demanded water 
in Israel – in 2009, Israel used 1.811 million cubic meters of the 1.849 mcm of 
water it produced.50 This does not leave enough for companies in Israel to use 
for fracking – will it find new sources or reallocate what it has from other 
sectors? Can it find new sources in its deprived region? In 2000, Israel crafted 
a deal with Turkey to purchase 1.75 cubic feet of water per year for twenty 
years.51 Although Turkey canceled this deal in 2010 following the Israeli 
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shooting of nine Turks in waters near the Gaza Strip, the opportunity to import 
water from elsewhere still remains.52 Though it is a very expensive process, 
the oil and gas shale will hopefully be lucrative enough to still profit after 
water demands are met. 
In-situ Extraction 
 
Another option, one that avoids the water scarcity problem, is a 
different type of shale oil extraction called In-situ. Invented by Dr. Fredrik 
Ljungström in 1940, the In-situ process allows extraction of shale petroleum 
without mining and without fracking. It involves heating the kerogen in rock 
while it is still underground causing it to expedite its natural process, eventual 
transformation into a shale reserve, and release its hydrocarbons upon 
reaching a specific heat for a certain amount of time.53 This is a method that 
allows for a mixture of crude oil extraction and hydrofracking – it does not 
use the water amounts that are used by fracking because it uses horizontal 
techniques to turn the reserve into a reserve then obtainable by traditional 
drilling methods. Though there are many methods used in preparing the rock 
for underground heating, Israel Energy Initiatives, the main extraction 
company in the Shelfa Basin, applies its in-situ technology during extraction 
with no water use. It does, however, use some water when cleaning equipment 
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and later separating the shale oil from shale gas.54 Krantz argues that because 
this process uses electricity to heat the rock, it is simply “trading natural gas 
for oil.”55 However, with the IEI’s calculated ratio of 3.1:1, the trade is 
economically smart and possible for Israel.56 Professor Parish of UVA also 
believes that there is an “advantage to the Israeli way” in relation to the IEI 
claimed “impenetrable layer of material that separates oil shale deposits form 
the water table.”57 If the science can be perfected, this will be a timely and 
miraculous method for Israel’s economy and political environment.  
As of now, GZA and “Jew Against Fracking” have had little effect on 
the Israeli government’s decisions concerning oil and natural gas. A third 
group, Life & Environment,” has gathered, as of 2012, 132 members in its 
alliance to protect Israel’s environment.58 It granted IEI its “Black Globe” 
award for “activities detrimental to the environment” during the national 
Green Globe Awards in 2011. The ironic award went to Mr. Netanyahu in 
2010.59 Even still, the election results in January have showed no impact from 
environmentalist groups yet. 
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International Relations 
 
 Aside from internal roadblocks, Israel faces several foreign issues in 
its start as an energy rich nation. Firstly, its relations with Turkey and Cyprus 
directly affect its ability to extract and distribute offshore the natural gas. The 
relations with these two nations are crucial in Israel’s role as an exporter to 
Europe. Furthermore, the international law, vague in its respects to national 
borders, is causing delay in exploration as well as political tensions around 
Israeli neighbors. 
 Turkey and Cyprus, and the rest of the Middle East 
 
 In May of 2010, the Miva Marara sailed illegally toward the port in 
Gaza. Seen as a threat by the Israeli military, this led to the deaths of eight 
Turkish activists and a Turkish-American aboard the ship.60 Since the incident, 
the Turkish-Israeli political and military ties have been severed. In response to 
the lethal reaction to the voyage, Turkey immediately cast away Israel’s 
Ambassador from Ankara and in 2012 held what Israel dismissed as a “show 
trial” that sentenced four former Israeli commanders to several life-long 
imprisonments each. 61 This was met by large-scale Israeli criticism. The 
demands by Turkey to salvage the countries’ relations were three-prong: a 
formal apology, compensation of one million dollars to each activist’s family 
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and the closing of the Gaza blockade.62 The formal apology, from Israeli 
Prime Minister Netanyahu to Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, was not 
expressed until almost three years later in March of 2013. Israel then 
countered the one million dollar compensation with an offer of one hundred 
thousand and still refuses to shut down the blockade on Gaza.63  
Though this was an enormous setback in Turkish-Israeli relations, 
Turkey still remains one of the few Arab nations that has “recognized and 
[will] continue to recognize the Israeli State, within the framework of the 
1967 borders and on the basis of the two-state solution” according to Prime 
Minister Erdogan.64 This is the main reason for which Israel needs to reinvest 
in its relationship with Turkey – it can be the major player in bettering 
relations between Israel and other Arab states. Turkey is growing in power 
and importance in the Middle East making it a strategically important ally for 
Israel in current times. U.S. President Barack Obama also noted that relations 
between the two countries are crucial “in order to achieve regional peace and 
security.”65 
 Despite the political issues that have risen in the past few years, trade 
between Turkey and Israel has grown thirty percent since 2010.66 A senior 
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Turkish procurement official claimed that there is currently a “need [for] a 
stable period of confidence-building measures” before they can discuss 
projects with Israel suppliers.67 Concerning the natural gas industry explicitly, 
Turkey is the cheapest export destination for Israel with the opportunity for a 
supply deal earning up to four billion dollars of income a year for Israel.68 
Reconciling ties to Turkey, though politically a stretch would really open up 
Israel’s export sector and prove to be a beneficial move in the long run. This 
also holds a potential threat to Israeli security. Turkey is a larger nation with 
interests in Israeli energy as well as the political power to help Israel address 
challenging bi-lateral relations with its Arab neighbors. This puts Turkey in 
the position to abuse its influence over Israel in a way that would reflect the 
resource curse. However, with a strong military presence and even stronger 
allies, Israel is well equipped to avoid outside interference such as this. 
 A country that affects Israel’s natural gas in a more immature stage is 
Cyprus. Right now, relations between the two countries concern the building 
of a liquefying natural gas plant.69 The two nations have planned to finance 
and operate the plant together, promoting an export profit for both of their 
newfound offshore reserves. The major concern with this deal, however, is the 
relationship between Cyprus and Turkey. Currently, Turkey does not 
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recognize Cyprus as a state.70 This has resulted in Turkey claiming some of the 
offshore reserves in Cyprus’s international jurisdiction as its own and 
threatening to “react strongly to further gas exploration by Cyprus.”71 The best 
option may be to build underwater pipelines to Turkey directly, but this would 
upset Cyprus-Israeli relations.72  However, if Israel were to go ahead with its 
plans to work with Cyprus, it could weaken already torn ties with Turkey and 
lose its opportunity to better economic relations with the rest of the Middle 
East.  
International Law 
 
 Aiding in the settlement of border and territory conflicts is 
international law as determined by the United Nations. The UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea states that: “Coastal states have sovereign rights over 
the continental shelf (the national area of the seabed) for exploring and 
exploiting it; the shelf can extend to at least 200 nautical miles from the shore, 
and more under specified circumstances.”73 However, parts of this law are 
vague. Measuring “natural prolongation” of a nation’s seabed proves to be 
ambiguous and is causing issues between Israel and its water-sharing 
neighbors.74 The Leviathan Basin lies within more than just Israel’s maritime 
borders. Currently, there have been no economic or military threats 
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concerning this area, but political tensions between Israel, Turkey and 
Lebanon are beginning to surface. On December 17, 2010, Israel and Cyprus 
signed an agreement that laid out the borders of each country’s exclusive 
economic zone. This is the only official maritime border for this sea area. 
Even when direct lines are finally drawn and borders are set for the other 
nations involved, the opportunity provided by horizontal drilling to extract 
resources from other’s seabeds may be the greatest cause of concern.75  
IX. The Resource Cruse 
 
After surpassing the initial shock, disbelief and eventual delight, the 
Israeli government needed to make the proper arrangements primarily to avoid 
what has come to be known as the resource curse. Defined in many ways, the 
resource curse generally refers to the paradox that a country with an 
abundance of a natural resource wealth will suffer poor or negative economic 
growth and potentially worsen the welfare of the entire nation. This is also 
referred to as the “Paradox of Plenty” and can eventually lead to the Dutch 
disease.76 A term coined after oil discoveries in the Netherlands went wrong, 
the Dutch disease refers to the eminent appreciation of real exchange rate and 
switch of capital and labor to the booming mineral sector which harms the 
competitiveness of non-booming export goods. A country then becomes 
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dependent upon one good, one export and one market price – a risky decision 
for any country to make. An example of the disease’s quickness is Equatorial 
New Guinea who in 1991 received sixty percent of its GDP from cocoa and 
coffee exports; by 2001, that number had fallen to nine percent.77 The entire 
agricultural sector was almost destroyed completely by the discovery of oil. 
Nigeria: Oil 
 
 Philippe Le Billon claimed several effects of the resource curse: higher 
risk of civil war, poor economic growth after the initial boom, governmental 
corruption and manipulation to mention just a few.78 In many cases, his claims 
were correct. Nigeria, for instance, is the most oil rich and cash poor per 
capita country in Africa. Since its independence from British colonialism in 
1960, Nigeria has raised over $350 billion in oil revenues and still remains 
one of the poorest countries in the world.79 In July of 2012, the government 
made $5.3 billion in oil revenues, meanwhile 50% of the total population lives 
below the poverty line. The people living in the areas where extraction takes 
place have yet to see almost any of the oil money that is destroying their 
homes, families and livelihoods. The Niger Delta has one of the worst living 
conditions in the world. Native tribes fight each other for what little clean 
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water there is after the oil companies have explored, drilled and contaminated 
their land. In 2004, oil giant Shell had a pipeline spill for which it waited a 
week to start cleaning up.80 The locals are abused by government militia that 
are sent to control them as they try to fight back against the companies, 
against the men destroying their lives. 81  This is a prime example of 
government manipulation. Most of the money in Nigeria is in the hands of the 
government. But this is also an example of governmental failure to fulfill its 
role as the protector of its people. The political leaders know the methods 
through which this turmoil can be avoided yet do not ensure that these 
methods are used. Also at fault are the companies that abuse the lax 
regulations to save money. What is meant through this example is to show the 
fault – it lies not on the inanimate resource in the ground but on the shoulders 
of the people who react to its discovery. The Nigerian government did not 
take any measures to protect its people. As a direct product of British 
colonialism, the Nigerian government was already set up as a centralized and 
potentially corrupt decision-making body. The treatment of the people in the 
Niger Delta is not by means of ignorance or complete lack of care, but in fact 
an example of higher importance placed upon wealth and power than total 
welfare. It also shows the power that companies, like Shell, have in smaller 
and more manipulative countries as its profits are greater with more 
environmentally detrimental methods of extraction and waste. In 1999, the 
Corruption Index compiled by Transparency International rated Nigeria the 
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most corrupt country in the world, followed by many other top oil-producing 
nations.82 Just as responsible, the oil companies are not taking any steps to 
avoid environmental defects. It is, therefore, the reaction by internal actors 
and external forces to the abundance of resource that is causing the negative 
affect described by Le Billon, not the presence of the resource itself.   
Chile and the United States: Copper 
 
 Le Billon, along with others, would then reason that if this were the 
case each time copious resources are found then his argument of the resource 
curse stands for the negative externalities cannot be avoided. Another example 
will prove this invalid, as well. The United States was the world’s leading 
mineral economy from 1890 to about 1920. This was, non-coincidentally, the 
same period in which the United States’ manufacturing industry boomed 
leading it to become the world’s largest goods manufacturer. It was because of 
the great amount of resources that the manufacturing success occurred. In fact, 
resource extraction aided the United States in establishing exploration, 
transportation, geological knowledge and many technologies used today.  It 
also taught proper methods of investment as well as mixing sectors in an 
appropriate manner, ie mineral and manufacturing. The minerals sector 
“constituted a leading edge of the knowledge economy.”  
 Look to the copper industry. Michigan copper mining boomed well 
into the 1920s. This was rivaled by the arguably more sophisticated industry 
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of Chile. Chilean copper ore was of a higher grade than the United States’, yet 
it still fell victim to the acclaimed resource curse.  This difference was caused 
by the U.S. investment in new extraction technologies – it could access more 
low-grade copper with less expensive technologies. Though the Chilean grade 
was higher by more than ten percent, the sheer volume of ore accessed could 
not rival that of the United States’. When the reserves of high-grade copper 
ore began to deplete, so did the Chilean industry. Without quick, decisive 
action, investment into the industry’s technologies, and understanding of 
future potential outcomes, any economy can fall a victim to mineral richness – 
even one as advanced as Chile’s.83  
Even today, the minerals sector is one of the more high-tech industries, 
incentivizing nations and companies to keep up with demand and forward 
technologies that can help do that. It pushes humankind to be better, faster and 
smarter – how can that be a curse? Handled incorrectly, like any good thing, 
can turn poorly. However, when handled appropriately, it can lead to 
prosperity not just for the resource rich country but for the world as a whole in 
terms of advancement and knowledge. Yes, the opportunity to take-it-and-run 
is always there, but the countries that come out on top; the countries that do 
not send their people into a hellish life of poverty and hunger and disease; the 
countries that do the right thing are the ones that disprove this so-called curse. 
It is not a curse, but a choice. Throughout history, most have made the wrong 
                                                 
83 The Chilean Copper section relies extensively on narrative and facts 
by: 
Wright, Gavin and Czelusta, Jesse. “The Myth of the Resource Curse.” 
Challenge Vol. 47, No. 2. March-April 2004. 6-38. 
 
 40 
choice. Or did not have the right knowledge or help to make the right one. But 
they made a choice, nonetheless. The Dutch Disease is no curse at all, simply 
a possibility that historically has been very difficult, for many reasons and 
many countries, to avoid.  
Norway 
 
 In a similar situation to Israel, Norway was a country that lagged 
behind its neighbors in oil, and in Norway’s case, other types of production.  
This all changed for Norway in 1969 with the discovery of oil and subsequent 
extraction in 1971. By the mid-1980’s, Norway had surpassed its fellow 
Scandinavian nations in GDP per capita and kept growing. This completely 
goes against the idea of the resource curse and the Dutch Disease.  Erling 
Røed Larsen in his analysis of the situation argues that both the curse and the 
disease “seem attributed to some unwelcome arrangement of institutions or 
inappropriate policies” and that “proper management can contain the 
problems.”84 Norway was upon the same opportunity as Nigeria and as Chile 
to fall to the curse, but its government was as strong willed to fight selfish and 
rash urges as it was eager to create prosperity for its country now and for 
future generations. There were several polices put into place to secure the 
labor market, promote education and research and the establishment of a 
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sovereign wealth fund that would protect, sustain and eventually grow the oil 
profits. Since 1969, Norway’s economy has boomed not just in the oil sector, 
but overall. Its sovereign wealth fund has become a source of revenue for the 
people of Norway, providing for social programs that better their lives as well 
as providing stability to the economy.85 The government acted properly to 
avoid the curse and the disease – it did not rush into development; it did not 
try to make a quick buck; it did not allow individual government officials to 
individually benefit from the oil wealth; and it did set up proper policies and 
regulations that ensured Norway’s stability, growth and prosperity for the 
future. Norway beat the so-called resource curse, and so can Israel.  
Canada: Oil 
 
There is another factor of the curse that is argued as reason for its 
validity. As stated, an abundant amount of natural resources can weaken a 
government’s will and limit its vision of long-term economic prosperity. The 
types of countries that have historically fallen to the curse are non-democratic, 
poor and/or previously corrupt.  This would exclude the United States and 
Norway from falling victim. This argument is flawed in two ways. First, the 
curse does not only affect small and poor countries. Note Chile, though a 
small country geographically, had a stable economy upon its discovery of 
copper. Its government made choices that kept Chile’s goals in the short term, 
which hurt the economy in the long run. A more recent example is Canada. 
Currently in northern Canada, there are projects extracting from the oil sands 
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(more commonly referred to as tar sands). This is not only detrimental to the 
environment and the lives of many natives; it shows the first signs of poor 
judgment within the Canadian government.86 An Exxon Mobil report claims 
that “for more than sixty years, Canada’s energy sector has provided a reliable 
supply of affordable energy to U.S. and Canadian markets,” claiming vast 
opportunities for both countries.87 Meanwhile, groups such as Greenpeace 
Canada focus on the environmental damages that “lace the air with toxins and 
convert farmland into wasteland.”88 Meeting in the middle, there is clearly an 
economic and energy advantage to using the bitumen found in the sands. 
However, is the environmental damage worth it? The government seems to 
believe so as it still allows the extraction process to take place. According to a 
Nanos Research poll in 2012, forty-two percent of Canadian people disagree 
with their government.89 Ignoring its people is one step toward corruption and 
ignorance for the Canadian government. It is experiencing a transfer of capital 
and talent into the tar sands industry, weakening other parts of its economy. 
Canada’s current government is very conservative with its base in Alberta, 
where most of the tar sands are located.90 This has allowed for Alberta, the 
prime province in favor of tar sands, to hold much weight within the 
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government. Canadian Green Party Leader and Member of Parliament 
Elizabeth May furthers questions of the Canadian government’s legitimacy 
concerning the energy sector claiming that Canada “[does] not have a grip on 
energy security.”91 She continues, “Stephen Harper, [the Prime Minister], 
has a single-minded number one goal no matter what you are talking 
about—oil sands development.”92  
 Canada is a large, economically sound and democratic 
nation. Yet, its government is still littered with people who make 
decisions not based on what the people want or what is best for them, 
but what is best for the wallets of the energy companies and the elite. 
The size and government in a country, though trends indicate a certain 
pattern, really do not hold as much weight as proponents of the 
resource curse would have one think. The second critique of the notion 
that poor, non-democratic nations fall victim to the curse is parallel to 
an argument made earlier in this paper; it is the reaction to the 
newfound resources that makes or breaks a country. Granted, the 
smaller and poorer countries are more likely to fall into traps of energy 
companies looking for a prophet or the manipulation of larger 
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countries looking for control. However, the point still remains that it is 
human action that causes the effects of the so-called resource curse and 
Dutch disease. The action of the companies using cheap and 
environmentally damaging methods and the action of the larger 
countries negotiating one-sided contracts is what, in many cases, 
causes governmental corruption and subsequently the negative results 
of resource abundance. They simply act upon the government to 
achieve their ends. In order for Israel to avoid the resource curse still, it 
must not only set up proper policy and watch for manipulation within 
its government, but also upon its government. It is possible to beat all 
aspect and causes of the resource curse, drawing the conclusion that it 
is not, in fact, a curse, and that Israel, as a strong democratic nation, 
can overcome the challenge it faces. 
X. Policy Recommendations for Israel 
Tzemach Committee  
 
As one of Israel’s largest roadblocks to energy-driven success, export 
policy is something upon which the government has already started working. 
In October of 2011, Mr. Netanyahu and the Minister of Energy and Water 
Resources appointed the Natural Gas Inter-ministerial Committee to examine 
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Israel’s petroleum policies.93 In 2012, the Committee, led by director general 
of the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources Shaul Tzemach (for which the 
Committee was publically nicknamed), released a report containing its 
recommendations and advice for the Israeli government. To create its report, 
the Committee held public hearing with private companies, environmentalist 
groups and government-owned companies as well as hosted a conference for 
potential stakeholders to express their opinions and concerns. Its suggestions 
concerning exports were as follows: 
 Source: Tzemach Committee Official Report, 2012 
 
The estimated domestic demand for Israel for twenty-five years is 450 bcm. 
Subtract that from the proven, or mostly prove, natural gas reserves and the 
amount left for exports is 500 bcm. Companies must also follow specific 
domestic market guidelines: 
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• Lease owners of gas field with reserves of more than 200 BCM will supply to 
the domestic market at least 50% of their reserves (there is an opportunity to 
increase exports to 75% with the export quota trade scheme) 
• Lease owners of gas field with reserves of 100-200 BCM will have to supply 
to the domestic market at least 40% of their reserves 
• Lease owners of gas field with reserves of 25-100 BCM will have to supply to 
the domestic market at least 25% of their reserves 
 
Lease owners will be allowed to sell their export quotas to others with 
government approval. Leased areas that are not exclusively in Israeli territory 
will be subject to special measures taken by the Israeli government and any 
other necessary political body.94 
Infrastructure  
 
 In the domestic sphere, aside from policy, the government also needs 
to invest in its natural gas infrastructure. There will be a need for more sea-to-
shore pipelines, handling facilities and refineries. Also, as was discovered in 
the mid 20th century, storage facilities for natural gas liquefied (for exports) 
and not, will need to be built. This is going to be a hard task with such little 
land available. 
At current prices, it would benefit Israel to export to Europe or Asia, 
with higher prices than Israel of $12 /mBtu and $16 /mBtu, respectively. 
However, because pipelines can only transfer gas across land, there will be a 
need to establish liquefaction plants to reach target markets across bodies of 
water. To do this, Israel must get government approval – there is sure to be a 
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backlash from environmental groups as well as nimbysts. It must also secure 
proper financing as liquefaction plants can cost up to five billion dollars to 
construct, not to mention operation and wage expenses.95 It will also be 
beneficial for Israel to get strategic partners in this part of the process. This 
means companies that know the business, know the technology and are not 
turned off by Israel’s lack of experience. As mentioned previously, there are 
currently negotiations with Cyprus concerning a LNG plant to be built in 
Cyprus. This would benefit bi-lateral relations, but complicate policies and 
regulations concerning exports. The best thing for Israel to do is invest in its 
own land, development and sector. That, along with the policies set forth by 
the Tzemach Committee, once implemented, will show a more confident, 
stable and seriously energy-minded Israel. This is the push that companies like 
Exxon, BP and Shell need before they invest in areas of question.  
Policy  
 
 As seen through Norway’s example, there needs to be a great deal of 
preventative policy measures to protect other sectors as well as ensure success 
of the newfound energy sector. The first of these policies is a “factor 
movement policy.” It will utilize a centralized wage formation system that can 
limit wage increases in the oil sector. This can help fight the Dutch disease by 
preventing a mass migration of labor from other sectors, which helps stabilize 
the entire economy. This is necessary with the initially lucrative nature of the 
energy sector – laborers tend to migrate to it and leave other industries 
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without sufficient capital to continue production and expansion. Norway’s 
“spillover-loss and education, research and development policies” are a push 
for self-efficiency within the technological side of the energy sector.96 This is 
a means through which Israel should invest into its people by providing 
education, training and expertise to Israelis. There also needs to be a monetary 
investment into the technology and research of exploration, extraction, 
refining and exporting. Israel should encourage its citizens to study abroad, 
learn from those who know how to get the most out of this sector, and bring 
their knowledge back to Israel. Finally, Israel needs to establish a type of 
petroleum fund abroad that it can use to ensure future stability and prevent 
present day catastrophe in its economy. 
Sovereign Wealth Fund 
 
 A Sovereign Wealth Fund is “a state-owned investment fund or entity 
that is commonly established form a balance of payments surpluses, official 
foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, governmental 
transfer payments, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from resource 
exports.”97 It is a fund that “generates economic security for future generations 
by converting endowments of natural resources into financial endowments.”98 
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If Israel is to utilize its newfound petroleum wealth in the most lucrative and 
positive way possible, it must set up at least one type of abroad fund. The 
Milken Institute sets outs clear guidelines in establishing such a fund. 
      To set up a proper and effective Sovereign Investment Fund: 
 
Determine a clear mission. This must be in place and understood from the outset. The 
government must look at its balance sheet and decide the fund’s purpose. This will drive all 
subsequent investment decisions. For example, if the government elects to create a 
stabilization fund—designed to shield the economy from commodity price volatility—the 
investments would be lower risk and shorter term for liquidity. A savings fund, designed to 
build long-term reserves over a longer time horizon, would enable the government to accept 
more risk. 
Formulate a governance framework. A proper governance structure is essential to shield the 
fund from political influences. The fund’s governance must remain independent, transparent, 
and subject to checks and balances. Participants discussed whether to create a single legal 
entity or a subsidiary department within either the Ministry of Finance or the Bank of Israel. 
They noted that good governance would also strengthen Israel’s credit ratings. 
Designate the fund’s revenue source. Besides investing natural gas commodity revenues and 
royalty payments, the fund could invest fiscal surplus and foreign exchange reserves, which 
the Lab recommends. The government must determine what share of commodity revenues to 
transfer into the fund and if other funding sources will be considered. 
Define the withdrawal and spending rules. The fund’s goal(s) will determine how the 
government will spend the returns. A stabilization fund, for example, might transfer some 
profits back to the fiscal budget so that government expenditures do not fluctuate dramatically. 
International experience has shown that best practices result if the legislature determines the 
rules for transfer in and withdrawal. 
Design the investment strategy. Investment policies must be in line with the fund’ primary 
mission. 
Source: The Milken Institute’s “Structuring Israel’s Sovereign Investment Fund” 
Determine a Clear Mission 
 
 Israel’s mission through its fund will be a combination of two agendas: 
macroeconomic stabilization and future generation savings. This must be 
officially decided upon the in Knesset to be most effective. One of the biggest 
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internal challenges facing the Israeli peoples’ well being is the squeezed 
Middle Class. With protests occurring over the past few years, Israel must 
focus on the demands and needs of its people. The protestors, most members 
of the middle class, “[call] for affordable housing, lower prices, higher taxes 
on the rich and better childcare.”99 A fund that is set up to provide monetary 
relief as soon as possible to the people is crucial for Israel’s survival as a 
democratic and just state. It must, however, be careful not to spend all of its 
revenues now, even if it is to better its social classes. The fund must also store 
savings in form of emergency funds and monetary aid for future generations. 
With these two missions in mind, Israel should create two separate yet linked 
funds: a savings fund and a stabilization fund. 
Formulate a Governance Framework 
 
The Tzemach Committee was an impressive start to establishing 
experts to help survey and regulate the new industry. Likewise, there needs to 
be a permanent agency that can monitor this fund. Members from the 
Ministries of Finance, Energy and Water Resources and Infrastructure, private 
and public sector representatives and the Bank of Israel should be represented 
in the advisory committee. However, the Board of Directors, which may cast 
votes concerning governance matters, mustn’t hold positions within the 
government nor energy sector. The President of the Board shall be nominated 
by the Prime Minister and approved by Knesset. The Knesset should 
determine the objectives, but the committee and board itself should be 
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sovereign in its methods and approaches to reaching its goals concerning the 
fund. If members of the committee or board are not preforming their duties, 
however, they can be removed by a Knesset vote. This is a way through which 
Israel can deter the government from holding too much power over the fund 
and potentially abusing its wealth. Solid and unbiased governance over the 
fund could help to better Israel’s credit rating and attract potential foreign 
investors.  
Designate the Fund’s Revenue Source 
 
 Taxes, royalties and revenues shall provide the fund’s primary 
revenue. It is also suggested to invest some of Israel’s fiscal surplus and 
foreign exchange reserves in the fund. The investment recommendations for 
each fund are as follows: 
• Savings Fund: 60% of energy sector revenue for first five years; 40% for the 
following ten years; and 25% for each remaining year. This is to ensure that 
the fund grows its assets quickly in the beginning for potential emergency 
response and maximized interest revenue.   
• Stabilization Fund: All revenues not sent to the Savings Fund will be directed 
to this fund to be used for internal betterment of the Israeli people through 
social programs, infrastructure enhancement, etc as voted on by the Knesset. 
Define Withdrawal and Spending Rules 
 
These rules should be determined by the Knesset, but centered on the mission 
of each fund. The rules should be sensitive to the common factors that cause 
fall to the resource curse and Dutch disease.  
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Design Investment Strategy 
 
 Investment policies must also be in line with the primary missions of 
the funds. Investment strategies should be under the jurisdiction of the 
committee and the board, following the governance framework. Outsourcing 
asset management to a large and well-known company could also prove 
beneficial in attracting foreign investors ask it shows a decreased risk with 
more experience.  
XI. Conclusion: The Holy Land’s Newest Blessing?  
XII.  
In 1999, the State of Israel discovered an offshore natural gas field that 
can change the course of its history for many years to come. With the 
discoveries in the past fourteen years, Israel will be able to break through its 
energy dependency on foreign imports and boost its economy as a whole. All 
of the natural gas reserves combined could satisfy Israel’s domestic needs for 
the next 150 years.100 However, with this massive discovery come many 
roadblocks to the success and prosperity that could be achieved. 
Environmental groups are concerned with extraction damages; political 
groups are concerned with trade and bi-lateral relations; and economists are 
concerned about the resource curse. This phenomenon have proven time and 
time again that countries that become suddenly resource wealthy can and do 
fall victim to things such as slow economic development, governmental 
corruption and overall poor welfare in their communities. This paper argued 
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that this so-called “curse” cannot be a curse simply by means that it can be 
avoided. Examples of the United States and Norway show that with correct 
political response through policy implementation, the newfound resources 
can, in fact, boost economies. Canada shows that not only poor, non-
democratic nations can fall victim to the curse. All of these countries, also 
including Chile, Nigeria and others, prove that the curse is not a reaction to 
great amounts of resources but an effect of poor decisions and actions of 
people. Whether it is the reaction of the local government to the discoveries or 
the action upon that government by outside sources, the response itself causes 
the negative affects. Companies in Israel have discovered some of the largest 
oil and natural gas fields in history. Israel is a small country, but one with a 
democratic government and strong allies. By implementing policies such as 
those described previously, the Israeli government will not only avoid the 
resource curse but also provide a stable and healthy future for its people.  
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XIII. Executive Summary 
 
 Between 1947 and 1999, over 500 exploratory sites were drilled 
in Israel. Of those searches, very few produced any type of petroleum. 
Israel was known as the one country in the Middle East without oil, 
leaving it dependent on foreign imports and its relations with other 
nations. However, even until the 1980’s only two countries other than 
the United States would publically trade with Israel, Egypt and 
Mexico. In the 1975 Sinai Agreement with the United States, Israel 
agreed to return its largest oil field, which it claimed during the 1967 
war, to Egypt in an effort to support regional peace. Though politically 
this was a wise and bold statement, economically it left Israel more 
dependent on foreign oil. This pattern of constantly searching for trade 
partners continued until 1999 and 2000 when Israel’s course of history 
was changed with the discovery of the Noa and Mari B fields, with 1.3 
and 30 billion cubic meters (bcm), respectively.  
 Since the original discovery just miles off the coast of Tel Aviv, 
Israel has been found to be home to many offshore natural gas fields 
and one of the largest onshore fields in the world. The Tamar field, at 
the time of its discovery in 2009, was the largest offshore gas field to be 
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discovered with its 246 bcm. It held this record until in 2010 when the 
Leviathan field was discovered to hold 480 bcm. The Tamar field alone 
is enough natural gas to meet Israel’s current demands for more than 
two decades. In 2011, the Shelfa shale was discovered onshore 
containing an estimated 250 billion barrels of oil, a number very 
comparable to Saudi Arabia’s 260 barrels. If these fields can be 
harvested, Israel will become not only self-sufficient, but one of the 
world’s largest exporters. 
 However, not everyone is excited for Israel to be swimming in 
black gold. Many economists and historians turned to the resource 
curse to help explain what is “surely” to happen to Israel after all its 
petroleum discovery. The recourse curse is a theory that when a 
country finds suddenly an abundance of any natural resource, this will 
cause the economy and social welfare to collapse. This idea is founded 
by the nature of governments, especially small and non-democratic, to 
take advantage of the situation in a way that enriches themselves and 
not their people. It is a means by which to explain the blood diamonds 
throughout Africa and the unbearable living situations in the Niger 
Delta where the people are not only harmed by the extraction of their 
natural resources, but never see a benefit. Supporters of this theory 
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claim its inevitability, however this paper argues that not only is the so 
called “curse” not inevitable, it is flawed in is primary assumption that 
the natural resource itself is responsible for the patterned downfall of 
resource rich nations.  
 First, look toward the Niger Delta. Since its independence from 
British colonialism in1960, Nigeria has raised over $350 billion in oil 
revenue and still remains one of the poorest countries in the world. In 
1999, Nigeria was rated the most corrupt nation in the world. The 
government takes all of the revenue, sharing none with its people, and 
pours most of it back into oil development and the rest goes into their 
pockets. Oil giants drilling in the Niger Delta do nothing to help to 
situation, either, using the methods that cause the worst environmental 
effects to save every cent possible. The theme throughout this 
explanation is thus: the oil isn’t causing the living turmoil that the 
people in the Niger Delta face, it’s the government and the oil 
companies making decisions that only better themselves that is 
causing it. It is a human decision and a human reaction to the resource 
that actually causes the curse. Yes, Nigeria is a politically weak nation 
with little bravery to stand up to outside forces that typically follow 
natural resource discoveries, but the government still cares little 
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enough about its people to try to protect them.  That is the source of the 
curse, not the oil.  
 Another example of mass oil discoveries is Norway. Since its 
discovery of oil in 1969, Norway’s economy and social welfare have 
boomed. Israel did not fall victim to the curse as Nigeria did for a few 
reasons. The government did not rush into extraction for the quick 
profit. Before anything else was done, Norway’s leaders set up policies 
that protected the country. It invested into the research and 
development of the new sector, provided incentives for people to stay 
in their respective sectors (so that all the labor force wouldn’t flock to 
the new, more lucrative jobs in oil), and, arguably the most important 
decision, it set up a sovereign wealth fund. A sovereign wealth fund is 
an account into which governments can place their surpluses from 
many areas. The Norwegian government chose to put its oil revenue 
into this fund so that future generations can also benefit from the 
resource money. By acting slowly, responsibly and considerately, 
Norway was able to do what one would expect a country with 
newfound resource wealth to do: prosper.  
 Israel, too, can beat the resource curse. It is a small, democratic 
nation with a government that has the ability and will power to act 
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appropriately and implement policies that will actually benefit the 
people. Though it has other roadblocks, such as environmentalist 
groups, its poor relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors and lack of 
experience in energy extraction and exports, Israel will be able to 
prosper just as Norway did if it follows a few crucial steps. It must first 
take its time in determining the policies. Acting too rash can cause the 
inflow of money to manipulate the future decisions of the Knesset, 
Israel’s parliament. It must work to keep all of its other sectors 
developing and thriving, as a major side effect of the curse is 
dependence on one sector. And finally, it must set up a sovereign 
wealth fund of its own so that future generations can benefit from the 
recent discoveries and the economy can stay stable with a steady flow 
of petroleum revenues.  
 In 1999, Israel became one of the luckiest or the luckiest 
countries during the turn of the century. Will it luck out and prosper 
with its newfound petroleum wealth? Or will it turn into another 
small, deteriorated country that is dependent on large international 
petroleum companies to destroy its land and take its resource to 
survive? The choice is up to Israel’s government. The reaction that the 
Knesset and other leaders have in the next decade will determine 
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Israel’s future. The curse is, in fact, a choice for them to make. This 
paper argues that they will make the right one, and shows them how 
to do it.  
 
